Article 12(1)(a) of the Qualification Directive, which provides for an exclusion ground from refugee status where the applicant benefits from protection or assistance from, inter alia, UNRWA, constitutes a lex specialis, and therefore requires an assessment of whether the applicant receives such assistance or protection. In addition, a person registered with UNRWA who receives effective protection or assistance from that agency in a third country which is not the territory of her habitual residence but which forms part of the area of operations of that agency must be considered as enjoying sufficient protection in that third country in accordance with Article 35 of the Asylum Procedures Directive and therefore may not obtain asylum in the EU. The Court lays down the conditions under which the applicant may be considered as enjoying sufficient protection in that third country.
The communication concerned M.K.A.H., a stateless child, and centred around whether Switzerland violated his rights under Articles 2 (2), 6, 7, 16, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 37 and 39 UNCRC when it decided to return him and his mother back to Bulgaria, pursuant to the agreement between Switzerland and Bulgaria relating to the readmission of migrants in irregular situations, where they had previously obtained subsidiary protection.
Some of the findings of the Committee included: (i) Switzerland had not respected the best interests of the child nor heard him at the time of the hearing of the asylum request; (ii) the child ran a real risk of being subject to inhuman and degrading treatment in case of a return to Bulgaria; (iii) Switzerland had not sought to take the necessary measures to verify what access to nationality the child could benefit from in Bulgaria. Article 7 UNCRC implicates that States must take the necessary positive actions to implement the right to acquire nationality.
The case concerned the interpretation of Articles 2(f) and 15(c) of Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection (hereafter recast Qualification Directive).
The national court referred two questions, concerning: i) the interpretation of article 15(c) in respect of how the degree of arbitrary violence in an armed conflict should be measured and ii) whether the assessment as to the existence of a serious and individual threat should be conducted on the basis of a comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case or should be based on determined factors.
The Court held that the interpretation of Article 15(c) must preclude the use of the threshold of minimum civilian casualties as the only determining factor but should be based on a comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances of the individual case.
The case concerns the interpretation of Article 12(1)(a) of EU Directive 2004/83. The question before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was how to determine who should have access to guarantees provided by Article 12, and what those guarantees entailed. The CJEU held that individuals who had received protection from a non-High Commissioner for Refugees (‘HCR’) UN organisation, but ceased to receive this protection due to a reason beyond their control, should automatically be granted refugee status by a Member State unless they fall into one of the exceptions of Article 12.
The applicant, a citizen of Bhutan of Nepali ethnicity was refused asylum in Ireland as the tribunal held that the applicant was stateless and that his claim for refugee status was to be determined by reference to Nepal. The applicant sought for this decision to be quashed in that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant’s risk of persecution in Bhutan. The Court dismissed the application holding that that the discriminatory and persecutory nature of a law depriving persons of nationality is not relevant to the determination of citizenship for the purposes of refugee status or statelessness.
The applicant is a child who was born in Ireland to a Cameroonian mother and a Ghanaian father, it was asserted that the child was stateless. The Refugee Appeal Tribunal denied the child applicant refugee status and the applicant requested a judicial review of the tribunal’s decision. The application centred around the tribunals alleged wrongful reliance on the applicant’s right to acquire citizenship in Ghana and Cameroon. The application for judicial review was ultimately unsuccessful.
The case concerned the refusal to grant international protection to the applicant who had produced evidence that he was going to lose his nationality due to pending criminal proceedings against him in his country of nationality.
The applicant appplicant was born in Russia and renounced his Russian nationality in 2000. He applied for a statelessness status in Luxembourg in 2008, but it was discovered that he had applied for asylum status in the Netherlands in 2006, which was rejected, so Luxembourg transferred the applicant to the Netherlands under the Dublin regulation. The applicant returned several times to Luxembourg and was sent back to the Netherlands. He made a repeated application for statelessness status in 2014, where the courts accepted his argument that statelessness status determination doesn't fall within the scope of the Dublin regulations, and the court also accepted that his voluntary renunciation of Russian nationality does not exclude him from protection under the 1954 Convention.
Applicants are two Syrian Kurds who entered Switzerland on Syrian passports and claimed asylum, but the asylum application was rejected. They subsequently claimed recognition as stateless persons, but that request failed too.
A stateless applicant born in Bhutan and previously resident in India was refused asylum in Ireland by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. The Tribunal stated that according to the 1951 Refugee Convention, statelessness per se, does not give rise to a claim to refugee status. The High Court held that, for the purposes of refugee status determination, the applicant does not have to prove that he was persecuted in all countries of former habitual residence. The applicant must demonstrate that one country was guilty of persecution, and that he is unable or unwilling to return to any of the states where he formerly habitually resided.
Deprivation of nationality made as an orderly sanction for failure to fulfil obligations that apply to all citizens, cannot be considered as a form of persecution that could justify asylum.