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The appellant (Mr. Hashi) was born in Somalia, arrived in the UK in 1995 as a child, and was granted UK citizenship in April 2004 at age 14. On 18 June 2012, the Secretary of State issued a deprivation order under section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981, stating it was conducive to the public good to remove Mr. Hashi’s citizenship on account of national-security concerns related to alleged involvement in Islamist extremism. By then, Mr. Hashi had left the UK, was detained in Djibouti, and ultimately transferred to the United States where he was prosecuted for terrorism-related offenses. Although he tried to appeal Special Immigration Appeals Commission’s (“SIAC”) decision, because his primary statelessness claim failed, SIAC refused to extend the 28-day limit for his late appeal. He argued that deprivation rendered him stateless, since Somalia’s 1962 citizenship law revoked Somali nationality when a Somali acquired foreign citizenship.  SIAC, however, found that this 1962 law had been superseded by a Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) that came into force in February 2004, explicitly allowing dual citizenship. SIAC preferred evidence from the Secretary of State’s expert (and noted inconsistencies in the defense expert’s prior testimony in a different case), concluding that Mr. Hashi remained a Somali national and thus would not be rendered stateless. The Court of Appeal upheld SIAC’s decision in all respects, confirming that the TFC had legal force from early 2004, that Mr. Hashi retained Somali nationality, and that his deprivation of British citizenship did not contravene the statutory prohibition against making a person stateless.

Recognition of the inaction of the Government of Ukraine in not bringing the subordinate regulatory legal act into compliance with the Law in connection with the introduction of the statelessness determination procedure. The Court held that the Government is obliged to bring the procedure for issuing a temporary residence permit into compliance with the law regulating the statelessness determination procedure.

The Head of the Registry Office in Krakow denied transcription of the foreign birth certificate listing two women as mothers on the basis that transcription of such birth certificate would be contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal order of the Republic of Poland. The applicant (one of the mothers) appealed against such decision to the Małopolski Voivode, but the Maopolski Voivide upheld the decision of the Head of the Registry Office in Krakow. Subsequently, the applicant appealed against the Małopolski Voivode`s decision to the Provincial Administrative Court in Kraków. The Provincial Administrative Court in Kraków agreed with the argumentation presented by the lower-instance authorities and dismissed the applicant`s appeal.

The Administrative Court of Freiburg issued a decision in the case of a stateless Bedoon from Kuwait who filed an application for international protection in Germany in 2018. The German authorities rejected her application as inadmissible in 2019 as they found the application to be a “secondary application” as the applicant had previously been through an unsuccessful asylum procedure in Denmark. In 2019, the applicant brought an action against this decision, claiming that the Danish authorities had not examined her personal circumstances and wrongly assumed that she was not a Bedoon from Kuwait. The Administrative Court found that the German authorities were wrong in rejecting the applicant’s asylum application as inadmissible.

The case concerned the determination of a Palestinian applicant’s statelessness, focusing on whether Palestine can be considered a State in this context and whether a travel document issued by the Palestinian National Authority represents proof of Palestinian nationality. The Hungarian Supreme Court (Kúria) ruled in 2019 that neither the administrative authority in charge of statelessness determination nor the courts involved in the appeal procedure are entitled to assess the statehood of an entity; this task corresponds uniquely to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. It also confirmed that holding a travel document does not always prove nationality.

The case concerns a Sierra Leonese man, whose claim for statelessness status was rejected due to credibility concerns related to his various previous asylum and alien policing procedures. The Budapest Administrative and Labour Court (Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság) – whose judgment was later confirmed by the second-instance Budapest Regional Court (Fővárosi Törvényszék) – emphasised the importance of considering and contrasting with each other all pieces of available evidence, some of which the defendant unlawfully excluded from its assessment. It also pointed out that credibility concerns related to the applicant’s previous asylum claims are not necessarily relevant for statelessness determination. In the subsequent procedure, following another rejection by the administrative authority, this time based on unspecified and incorrectly referenced national security concerns, the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court repeatedly quashed the decision and granted the applicant statelessness status, based mainly on his unquestioned Sierra Leonese origin (about which he has been consistent through all his asylum and alien policing procedures and which an anthropologist expert witness statement also corroborated) and several official confirmations by Sierra Leonese consular authorities that the applicant was not that country’s national. 

This summary concerns the cases of the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court (Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság), Judgment no. 26.K.31.000/2016/16. of 6 June 2016, entirely confirmed on appeal by the Budapest Regional Court (Fővárosi Törvényszék), Judgment no. 1.Kf.650.107/2016/5. of 19 April 2017; in the subsequent procedure: Hungary – Budapest Administrative and Labour Court (Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság) Judgment no. 18.K.31.696/2018/23. of 18 October 2018.

The case concerns the statelessness determination of a woman from Nigeria who arrived in Hungary in 2003. The Budapest Administrative and Labour Court (Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munakügyi Bíróság) and, in its final and affirmative second-instance judgment, the Budapest Regional Court (Budapesti Törvényszék) confirmed that the lack of documentary evidence regarding an applicant’s personal identity is insufficient for rejecting their recognition as a stateless person if the relevant country of origin has officially confirmed the applicant’s lack of nationality and the applicant has made consistent statements about their identity and origin in previous proceedings. The two courts also ruled that it cannot be evaluated to the applicant’s detriment that their country of birth and previous residence failed to provide them with identity documents. Importantly, they also clarified that credibility concerns from previous asylum procedures (if they do not concern identity and origin) and the refusal to complete a travel document request form on one occasion are not material considerations for the statelessness determination procure.

This case summary includes a summary of the Budapest Administrative and Labour Court (Fővárosi Közigazgatási és Munkaügyi Bíróság), Judgment no. 20.K.33.955/2016/8. of 17 February 2017 and the Budapest Regional Court (Fővárosi Törvényszék), Judgment no. 1.Kf.650.032/2017/8. of 20 December 2017, which entirely confirmed the case on appeal.

The case concerned the statelessness determination of a former Yugoslav national born in Kosovo, who had been living in Hungary since 1993, and whose Serbian nationality was officially recognised by Serbia in 2007. The 2009 judgment of the Budapest Court (Fővárosi Bíróság) in Hungary upheld that such an official confirmation disproves the applicant’s statelessness, even if he had never lived in the Republic of Serbia. The Court emphasised that the only subject matter of statelessness determination is the applicability of the 1954 Convention’s definition of a stateless person while examining the compatibility of the applicant’s expulsion to the country of nationality with other human rights obligations (such as the right to family life or non-refoulement) does not correspond to this particular procedure.

The applicant appealed the order of the Rostov Regional Court dismissing his complaint against the order of the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation to extradite him for criminal prosecution to the law enforcement authorities of the Republic of Belarus. The applicant was a stateless individual and was in the process of applying for Russian nationality. Later, the applicant filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. The Judicial Board of the Supreme Court (Criminal Division) of the Russian Federation upheld the decision of the lower court.

The applicant claims to have suffered material and non-material damage because of acts and omissions by officials of the Municipality of Sliven. Her claims relate to the refusal by officials to issue her identity documents because they did not consider her to be a Bulgarian national. The Burgas Administrative Court dismissed the case as unfounded because the applicant did not appeal to the competent administrative body(which was the Ministry of Justice and not the Municipality of Sliven).

The applicant, a formerly stateless person who lived in Russia, challenged an exclusion order issued by the Russian Ministry of Justice in 2015 on the basis of his presence in Russia being undesirable due to unspent criminal convictions. The applicant was granted Russian nationality in 2021, but claimed that the existing exclusion order made against him breached his rights under Article 8 ECHR because the effect of the exclusion order could still result in his expulsion from Russia. The ECtHR found the complaint inadmissible as it held that the exclusion order became unenforceable once the applicant obtained Russian nationality, making his complaint under Article 8 of the Convention unfounded.

The National Court (Audiencia Nacional) confirmed the rejection of the applicant's statelessness status on the ground that the presumption of Mauritanian nationality, derived from the fact that the applicant held a Mauritanian passport, had not been rebutted. 

The applicant, after having received statelessness status by a decision issued by the Court of Rome, applied for recognition of Italian nationality under Article 1(2) of Law 91/92 (which provides that: 'The child of unknown parents found in the territory of the Republic shall be considered a citizen by birth, unless the possession of another citizenship is proved'). This application was rejected by the municipality, the latter considering that the procedure provided for by Article 9(1)(e) of Law 91/92, which provides that Italian nationality may be recognised to 'stateless persons who have been legally residing in the territory of the Republic for at least five years', shall be applied instead.

The Court of Naples declared the Article 1(2) of Law 91/92 shall be applied in the specific case for the following reasons:

- Article 1(2) of Law 91/92 established a "presumption of birth on Italian territory" which could be rebutted only by a proof to the contrary, and such proof could only be proof that the person concerned had another citizenship (proof that was not possible in the specific circumstances, since it was undisputed that the applicant had a stateless status, having been recognised as such by the court in Rome);

- Stateless status has a "declaratory and not a constitutive" nature (as established by previous Supreme Court case law and in particular Supreme court decision no. 4823 of 4 May 2004 and Supreme court decision no. 16489 of 19 June 2019). Stateless status is by definition a situation of uncertainty and vulnerability which must therefore be limited;

- Article 1(2) of Law 91/92, providing for the automatic acquisition of citizenship (as confirmed by the previous Supreme Court decision no. 1053 of 14 January 2022) is precisely intended to prevent any statelessness status. 

- If the objective conditions for the automatic acquisition of citizenship laid down in Article 1(2) of Law 91/92 are met, the person concerned is granted a subjective right to citizenship which cannot be denied by the body responsible for assessing citizenship (i.e. the Ministry of Public Affairs).

In light of the above the Court of Naples declared the acquisition of Italian nationality by the stateless person concerned on the basis of Article 1(2) of Law 91/92.

The case concerns the challenge before the French Council of State (Conseil d'État) of a refusal by the Administrative Court of Appeal to grant the applicant statelessness status. As the Administrative Court of Appeal misinterpreted the arguments of the French Office of Protection of refugees and stateless people (OFPRA), the Council of State quashed its ruling and decided on the merits of the case. The Council of State however reached the same outcome as the Administrative Court of Appeal and refused to grant the applicant statelessness status. 

The case concerns a married couple, an Iraqi man and a stateless woman, who were denied a judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse their application for naturalisation in light of their former membership to the Ba’ath party in Iraq, citing this membership as sufficient to show that the applicants were not ‘of good character’.

The Supreme Court considered that Western Sahara was not part of Spain for the purposes of granting nationality to a Saharawi residing in the territory of Western Sahara until the departure of Spain from said territory. The Supreme Court overturned an earlier ruling by the High Court of Justice of the Balearic Islands that had granted Spanish nationality to a Sahrawi applicant.

The Supreme Court confirms the decision of the National High Court which set aside a judgment of the Ministry of Justice denying an application to obtain Spanish nationality by a stateless person, on the basis that such denial was arbitrary.

The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) examined the extent of the powers of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) in cases where the Secretary of State has deprived a British citizen of citizenship on national security grounds. The court clarified the interpretation of Section 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 in light of previous landmark cases, specifically Rehman and Begum. Ultimately, the Court upheld the SIAC's decisions, asserting that while the SIAC’s review scope is broader than initially thought, its handling of the appellant's case did not warrant reversal. 

The European Commission applied to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to issue a declaration that Hungary was in violation of Article 6 of Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (‘Procedures Directive’). This violation was alleged on the basis of a Hungarian law which required third-country nationals or stateless persons who wished to apply for international protection to apply from a Hungarian embassy in a third country. The CJEU issued a declaration that Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6 of the Procedures Directive.

The European Commission initiated enforcement proceedings against Hungary due to alleged non-compliance with the CJEU’s 2020 Commission v Hungary judgment. The Court had to rule on whether the case was admissible, whether Hungary had violated Directive 2008/115/EC and Directive 2013/32/EU and, if so, what penalty was appropriate. The CJEU found Hungary in violation of its obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU.

In a case concerning an application for statelessness determination, the Italian Court of Cassation found that the ordinary judiciary had jurisdiction over the matter and that the Ministry of Domestic Affairs was the right defendant in this case.

The case concerns how the authorities of an EU Member State should assess a subsequent application for international protection lodged by two stateless persons of Palestinian origin. The applicants’ registration with UNRWA prevented them, in principle, from beneficiating from refugee status under the Qualification Directive. However, the CJEU makes clear that the situation in Gaza after 7 October 2023 triggers the exception provided in Article 12(1)(a) of the Directive and that stateless persons of Palestinian origin can now be considered as refugees under EU law.   

The UK Supreme Court ruled on the case of a Belarusian national against whom a deportation order remains in place but who is in limbo, having been subject to several unsuccessful removal attempts and detention. The Home Secretary refused to grant him residence (leave to remain) even though there is no real prospect of his removal. On appeal, the UK Supreme Court held that because the applicant thwarted his removal with his own deliberate actions (allegedly due to his refusal to disclose his real identity), the decision does not violate the applicant’s right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR.

The applicant was denied statelessness status on the ground that national-level legislation does not define the authority responsible for granting this status and the procedure for its determination. The Court held that there were no reasonable grounds for denying the applicant statelessness status, and the explicit legal provision obliging the Migration Directorate to grant statelessness status and issue the necessary documents is regulated by Article 28 of the 1954 Convention and Article 59 par. (1) and (8) of the Bulgarian Identity Documents Act. The Court highlighted Bulgaria´s ratification of the 1954 Convention and emphasised the need for administrative assistance to stateless people.

The applicant appealed the refusal of the Regional Administrative Court of his application for a residence permit for family reunification with his son to the Council of State (Consiglio di Stato). While the Council of State acknowledges that the 1954 Convention assimilates stateless persons to nationals as far as their enjoyment of civil rights is concerned, it held that the traditional principle remains whereby, as far as their public status is concerned, stateless persons are always assimilated to foreigners. Moreover, it found that no special right of stateless persons to family reunification other than that of other foreigners can be inferred from the rules governing the status of stateless persons.