Case Law Search

The case concerns the challenge before the French Council of State (Conseil d'État) of a refusal by the Administrative Court of Appeal to grant the applicant statelessness status. As the Administrative Court of Appeal misinterpreted the arguments of the French Office of Protection of refugees and stateless people (OFPRA), the Council of State quashed its ruling and decided on the merits of the case. The Council of State however reached the same outcome as the Administrative Court of Appeal and refused to grant the applicant statelessness status. 

The case concerns a married couple, an Iraqi man and a stateless woman, who were denied a judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse their application for naturalisation in light of their former membership to the Ba’ath party in Iraq, citing this membership as sufficient to show that the applicants were not ‘of good character’.

The Supreme Court considered that Western Sahara was not part of Spain for the purposes of granting nationality to a Saharawi residing in the territory of Western Sahara until the departure of Spain from said territory. The Supreme Court overturned an earlier ruling by the High Court of Justice of the Balearic Islands that had granted Spanish nationality to a Sahrawi applicant.

The Supreme Court confirms the decision of the National High Court which set aside a judgment of the Ministry of Justice denying an application to obtain Spanish nationality by a stateless person, on the basis that such denial was arbitrary.

The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) examined the extent of the powers of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) in cases where the Secretary of State has deprived a British citizen of citizenship on national security grounds. The court clarified the interpretation of Section 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 in light of previous landmark cases, specifically Rehman and Begum. Ultimately, the Court upheld the SIAC's decisions, asserting that while the SIAC’s review scope is broader than initially thought, its handling of the appellant's case did not warrant reversal. 

The European Commission applied to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to issue a declaration that Hungary was in violation of Article 6 of Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (‘Procedures Directive’). This violation was alleged on the basis of a Hungarian law which required third-country nationals or stateless persons who wished to apply for international protection to apply from a Hungarian embassy in a third country. The CJEU issued a declaration that Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations under Article 6 of the Procedures Directive.

The European Commission initiated enforcement proceedings against Hungary due to alleged non-compliance with the CJEU’s 2020 Commission v Hungary judgment. The Court had to rule on whether the case was admissible, whether Hungary had violated Directive 2008/115/EC and Directive 2013/32/EU and, if so, what penalty was appropriate. The CJEU found Hungary in violation of its obligations under Article 260(1) TFEU.

In a case concerning statutory interpretation of the BNA 1981, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) held that the withdrawal of a deprivation order by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) did not take retrospective effect.

Therefore, E3 and N3 had been deprived of their British citizenship from the date of the deprivation order until the date of its withdrawal. As a consequence, ZA, E3’s daughter born in Bangladesh during the time when E3 had been deprived of his British citizenship, could not access British citizenship by descent. This judgment has since been reversed on some issues in the UK Supreme Court decision N3 v Secretary of State for the Home Department; ZA v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] UKSC 6. 

In a case concerning an application for statelessness determination, the Italian Court of Cassation found that the ordinary judiciary had jurisdiction over the matter and that the Ministry of Domestic Affairs was the right defendant in this case.

The Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the Upper Tribunal of the United Kingdom considered an appeal based on the appellant’s right to a private and family life as well as the Home Department’s failure to recognise the appellant’s statelessness status. The appellant, a Nigerian national, was appealing the First-tier Tribunal’s (“FTT”) dismissal of her appeal against a Home Department decision that refused her application for leave to remain in the UK. The Upper Tribunal ruled against the appellant upholding the judgment of the FTT. 

The case concerns how the authorities of an EU Member State should assess a subsequent application for international protection lodged by two stateless persons of Palestinian origin. The applicants’ registration with UNRWA prevented them, in principle, from beneficiating from refugee status under the Qualification Directive. However, the CJEU makes clear that the situation in Gaza after 7 October 2023 triggers the exception provided in Article 12(1)(a) of the Directive and that stateless persons of Palestinian origin can now be considered as refugees under EU law.   

The dispute concerned the entitlement to Irish citizenship of a child born in Ireland whose parent has subsidiary protection. Under Irish law, a person born in Ireland is entitled to Irish citizenship if one parent has a permanent right to reside in Ireland. However, the High Court ruled that children of parents with subsidiary protection are not entitled to Irish citizenship, as subsidiary protection is a temporary and contingent status. The Supreme Court confirmed this holding in a later ruling (TRI (a minor) v The Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Justice [2025] IESC 7).

The Court of Rome, XVIII Civil Section (Specialized Section on Human Rights and Immigration), was asked to rule on the right to acquire Italian citizenship under specific national law provisions. The case involved an individual who was born in Italy and had resided there continuously but was denied citizenship due to the lack of a valid residence permit at the time of the application. The Tribunal found that continuous legal residence should be interpreted in a way that does not penalise applicants for administrative failures beyond their control.

The case concerns a stateless person of Palestinian origin who was registered as a refugee with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and lived in a UNRWA refugee camp in Lebanon before his departure. He applied for asylum in the Netherlands twice but was rejected. This case concerns an appeal of these decisions. The Council of State held that the fact that the applicant had voluntarily left UNRWA’s working area sufficed to justify his exclusion from refugee status under Article 1(D) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

The UK Supreme Court ruled on the case of a Belarusian national against whom a deportation order remains in place but who is in limbo, having been subject to several unsuccessful removal attempts and detention. The Home Secretary refused to grant him residence (leave to remain) even though there is no real prospect of his removal. On appeal, the UK Supreme Court held that because the applicant thwarted his removal with his own deliberate actions (allegedly due to his refusal to disclose his real identity), the decision does not violate the applicant’s right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR.

The applicant was denied statelessness status on the ground that national-level legislation does not define the authority responsible for granting this status and the procedure for its determination. The Court held that there were no reasonable grounds for denying the applicant statelessness status, and the explicit legal provision obliging the Migration Directorate to grant statelessness status and issue the necessary documents is regulated by Article 28 of the 1954 Convention and Article 59 par. (1) and (8) of the Bulgarian Identity Documents Act. The Court highlighted Bulgaria´s ratification of the 1954 Convention and emphasised the need for administrative assistance to stateless people.

The applicant appealed the refusal of the Regional Administrative Court of his application for a residence permit for family reunification with his son to the Council of State (Consiglio di Stato). While the Council of State acknowledges that the 1954 Convention assimilates stateless persons to nationals as far as their enjoyment of civil rights is concerned, it held that the traditional principle remains whereby, as far as their public status is concerned, stateless persons are always assimilated to foreigners. Moreover, it found that no special right of stateless persons to family reunification other than that of other foreigners can be inferred from the rules governing the status of stateless persons.

The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court the rejection of his application for the statelessness determination procedure by the Court and the Court of Appeal, on the ground of failure to meet the evidentiary requirements. The Supreme Court rejected the appeal, finding that the lower court had correctly held that the condition of stateless persons is that of those who have lost their original nationality and have not acquired that of their State of residence, at the same time not being endowed with guarantees equivalent to those of nationality or with special protection by international bodies. The applicant had not submitted such proof, as he had only attached his own 20-years' residence in Italy and a temporary recognition of refugee status.

The case involves a complaint by the applicant against the refusal of the Director of the Territorial Unite "Migration" in Dobrich to recognise her as a stateless person and issue the corresponding identity document. The Administrative Court of Dobrich considered the case and ruled that the refusal violated Art. 28 of the 1954 Convention and Article 59 of the Bulgarian Identity Documents Act. Moreover, the Court stated that the absence of a body governed by specific legal provisions at the national level does not justify denying rights to stateless persons. The Court highlighted Bulgaria´s ratification of the 1954 Convention and emphasised the need for administrative assistance to stateless people.

In 1991, Slovenia gained its independence. Subsequently, legal issues arose concerning the legal status of nationals from other republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) who were lawfully and permanently residing in Slovenia during this transition. They could, up to a certain date, choose to apply for Slovenian nationality. If they did not apply or if their application was rejected, the newly passed Law on Foreigners (ZTuj) would apply to them in accordance with Article 81(2) of ZTuj. However, for those nationals of other SFRY republics that did not opt for Slovenian nationality or whose application was rejected, this law failed to define the conditions for obtaining permanent residence. These individuals found themselves in a legal vacuum, leading to uncertainty and challenges regarding their legal status, facing possible deportation and limited access to essential services. In this decision, the Constitutional Court of Slovenia declared that Article 81(2) of ZTuj was unconstitutional as it had not outlined the conditions for acquiring permanent residence for this specific group of individuals.

The respondent was deprived of his British nationality by a decision taken by the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“SSHD”) under section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981. The SSHD argued that the deprivation decision did not render the respondent stateless but rather it was the respondent’s failure to re-apply for Iraqi nationality, which he had previously held, that did so. The Supreme Court dismissed this argument and refused the appeal.

The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court to overturn the decisions rejecting his application for recognition of his statelessness status from the first instance court and the Court of Appeal on the ground of an error in the choice of procedure (chamber procedure rather than the ordinary recognition procedure).

The case raised one point of principle: what type of court procedure should be applied in determining statelessness. The Supreme Court sustained the Court of Appeal’s previous decision determining that the ordinary procedure of cognition (procedimento ordinario di cognizione) is the type of court procedure to be applied.

Shamima Begum, aged 15, left the UK for Syria to live with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”). She was deprived of her British citizenship by a decision taken by the Secretary of State for the Home Department on national security grounds under section 40(2) of the British Nationality Act 1981. On appeal from the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (“SIAC”), the Court of Appeal held that the decision to deprive Begum of her citizenship was lawful and dismissed the appeal.

The case concerns the revocation of the applicant’s Danish nationality by the Danish Ministry of Immigration and Integration, on the basis of her membership in the Islamic State. The Court held that the Danish courts had conducted an adequate and sufficient assessment of the decision to revoke the applicant’s nationality, and therefore rejected the application as inadmissible.

The applicant was a former Soviet national who served in a military unit based in Tajikistan. During his station in Tajikistan, the 1991 Russian Citizenship Act came into force, leading him to move to Russia and continue his military service there. Several decades later, the Russian Ministry of the Interior concluded that the applicant had not acquired Russian nationality because he had not been living in Russia when the Russian Citizenship Act entered into force, subsequently destroying the applicant's passport. The Court found a violation of Article 8 ECHR for the interference with the applicant's private and family life and the excessive formalism of Russian authorities.