The Court of Appeal (Civil Division) examined the extent of the powers of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) in cases where the Secretary of State has deprived a British citizen of citizenship on national security grounds. The court clarified the interpretation of Section 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 in light of previous landmark cases, specifically Rehman and Begum. Ultimately, the Court upheld the SIAC's decisions, asserting that while the SIAC’s review scope is broader than initially thought, its handling of the appellant's case did not warrant reversal.
- Section 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997
- Section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981
The appellant challenged the decisions of the Secretary of State for the Home Department (SSHD) to deprive her of British citizenship on grounds of national security and to refuse her entry clearance. The Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) initially dismissed the appeals. The applicant then appealed on the basis that SIAC had misinterpreted its role by limiting its review to public law errors and not fully assessing the factual basis and discretionary decisions of the Secretary of State.
The central legal issue was the interpretation of section 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997, particularly whether SIAC should engage in a full merits review of the Secretary of State's decisions or restrict itself to identifying legal errors.
It was argued that the SIAC had taken an overly narrow view of its powers by focusing solely on whether the SSHD had made a public law error. The SIAC's function is not merely to ensure procedural correctness but also to evaluate the substantive merits of the decisions made by the SSHD including the factual basis of the decisions and whether the conclusions were reasonable.
Next, the applicants referenced the cases Rehman and Begum to support their argument. In Rehman, the Court established that decisions on national security matters require careful judicial scrutiny, considering the severity of depriving an individual of citizenship. In Begum, it was argued that the court should independently verify the justifications for decisions affecting fundamental rights.
It was argued that, ultimately, without a full merits review, individuals could be unjustly deprived of their citizenship based on flawed or incomplete assessments.
The SSHD argued that the SIAC's review should be confined to ensuring the legality of the decision-making process, rather than reassessing the substantive merits of the decisions. They contended that the SIAC’s role was to ensure that the SSHD’s decisions were made in accordance with the law and did not involve procedural errors, rather than to substitute its own judgement for that of the SSHD.
The SSHD argued that decisions involving national security are primarily within the purview of the executive branch, which has the expertise and access to sensitive information necessary to make such determinations. This principle is rooted in the notion that the executive is better equipped to assess risks and make decisions that protect national security.
The Court of Appeal found that the SIAC’s role is more extensive than previously interpreted, requiring it to engage in a broader assessment, including an evaluation of the factual basis and the reasonableness of the SSHD decisions. However, it concluded that despite the broader remit, the SIAC had not materially erred in its approach in this specific case.
The Court emphasised the distinction between a full merits review and judicial review, underscoring the unique nature of the SIAC’s role in balancing national security considerations with individual rights.
Neither the authorities nor the relevant procedural rules restricted in any way the evidence which the SIAC was required to consider on an appeal. Two factors were highly significant. First, the appellant had no opportunity to give her own account, or to influence the SSHD’s thinking, before the deprivation decision was made. Second, because this was an appeal, and because of its special expertise, the SIAC was in a uniquely good position, within the limits expressed in Rehman and Begum, to review and rigorously test the assessment of an appellant's risk to national security.
The SIAC can, and in some cases must, make findings of fact based on its own assessment of the evidence on the appeal. As long as the SIAC respects the limits of the Rehman approach, it may make whatever findings of fact it considers appropriate.
The court outlined three broad issues, with emphasis on the final issue, i.e., whether the SIAC erred in law in its approach in this case. This contained three sub-issues. Firstly, the question was whether the SIAC erred in law in making the findings of fact in this case and the Court held it did not. The SIAC was right to consider that it could make relevant findings, based on its assessment of all the evidence on the appeal. In this case, the SIAC made, and was entitled to make, at least 13 important findings, some of fact, based on the evidence as a whole which were explained fully.
The second sub-issue was whether the SIAC erred in law in its approach to the evidence either by making incorrect findings of fact or by declining to make findings of fact. On this issue, the court acknowledged that the SIAC was not obliged to accept the expert evidence which, allegedly, would have compelled a different conclusion. This is, in part, because the premise of the evidence was that the applicant’s account was truthful, but the SIAC had found the applicants’ evidence to be untruthful at times. Furthermore, where a tribunal has expertise of its own, it is not legally obliged to accept the uncontradicted evidence of an expert.
The third issue was whether the SIAC erred in its approach to the second national security statement. The Court of Appeal said that it did not consider the SIAC to have made an error in law when rejecting the applicant’s criticism that this part of the appeal should have been treated as an application for judicial review. The Court held that the SIAC was right to review the SSHD’s assessment to determine whether the assessment decision had a rational basis rather than substituting its own assessment for the case. Therefore, the SIAC has not materially erred in law in its approach to its own functions in appeal cases.
The Court upheld the SIAC's decisions, asserting that while the SIAC’s review scope is broader than initially thought, its handling of the appellant's case did not warrant reversal. The appeal was dismissed.
- Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 29; [2003] 1 AC 153
- Begum v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] UKSC 7; [2022] AC 765
- General Medical Council v Michalak [2017] UKSC 71; [2017] 1 WLR
- Fage UK Limited v Chobani [2014] EWCA Civ 5; [2014] FSR 29
- Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48
- Kentucky Fried Chicken v Secretary of State for the Environment [1978] EGLR 139